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Editorial Comment
DE FACTO MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

It will be interesting to note what effect the Supreme
Court of Indiana will give to acts done under the city manager or commission form of government which has existed
in Michigan City, Indiana, during the past five years, and
which has recently been declared unconstitutional under the
Indiana state constitution.
A de facto corporation may be defined as one which
has been organized through a bona fide attempt of its organizers to comply with the requirements of a then existing
valid enabling statute. Such a corporation may still be de
facto though in fact all of the requirements have not been
complied with. A de jure corporation is one which has been
validly organized under a then existing valid enabling
statute. The existence of neither a de facto nor a de jure
corporation may be questioned collaterally, the State alone
having the power to bring their existence into question, and
then only by the direct proceeding of quo warranto. Doty
v. Patterson (1900) 155 Indiana 60. When, however, a
corporation has neither a de facto nor a de jure existenceand a corporation which is organized under an unconstitutional statute has no existence-its existence may be questioned collaterally. Harriman v. Southam (1861), 16 Indiana 190.
Generally speaking, the same classification which applies to corporations generally applies to municipal corporations. It has accordingly been held in the federal courts that
when a state statute under which a municipal corporation
has been organized is later declared to be unconstitutional
under the federal Constitution, all of the acts of the corporation are void and the officers who assume to act under
its authority are held personally liable, the unconstitutional
statute affording them no protection. Norton v. Shelby
County, 185 U. S. 135.
It is held, however, by a number of states that a municipal corporation, though created under an unconstitutional
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enabling statute, is a de facto corporation, and, so long as
the State does not terminate its existence by a direct proceeding in quo warranto, which, incidentally, must be instituted by the attorney general, it may exercise through its
officers the powers ostensibly conferred upon it as completely as if it were created by a valid law. Courts so holding have based their decisions on the theory that public policy requires obedience from its citizens. Lang v. Mayor, etc.,
of City of Bayonne, 1917 (N.J.), 68 Atlantic 90. State
ex rel. Braszell v. Tucker, 48 Missouri Appellate 531.
Bert v. Winona, etc., Railroad Company (Minnesota), 18
North Western 285.
While the cases holding that an officer who acts under
an unconstitutional statute acts at his peril, since the statute
never had a valid existence and was void ab initio, are founded 'on much the better logic, yet it seems to the writer
that those state courts which have held that for reasons of
public policy a municipal corporation organized under an
unconstitutional statute will be held to have de facto powers
until its enabling statute is actually held to be unconstitutional, have the equities on their side. If an ostensible municipal corporation assumes to carry on the functions usually
carried on by municipal corporations, under a supposedly
valid enabling statute, why should not the public and, conversely, the officers who assume in good faith to execute the
duties for which they were appointed, be protected for the
period during which the municipality acted under the unconstitutional enabling statute? There seems to the writer
to be no good reason why acts done by a municipal corporation under unconstitutional authority should be held absolutely void ab initio. Every police officer who made an arrest under the unconstitutional enabling act would be subject to a civil action for false imprisonment and every contract entered into in the name and on behalf of the municipality would be unenforceable. It seems unjust that in the
name and for the sake of legal logic innocent persons should
thus be made to suffer.
-F. T. R.

